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This paper investigates the relationship between the dividend policy and ownership structure in Russian 
public companies. A study of the link between dividends and ownership concentration is based on the 
sample of public companies with dual class share structure. These shares were traded on the Russian 
Trading System (RTS) in the period of 2003-2009. The authors explore a broad range of factors related to 
the ownership concentration. This study allows making conclusions on the impact of the ownership 
concentration on the dividend policy. Moreover, there is evidence that this impact differs for the 
dividends on ordinary and preferred shares. 
 
Keywords 





The growing attention to the agency problem and to the role of dividends in mitigating an 
agency problem is explained, in particular, by the growing number of corporate scandals 
related to violation of shareholders’ rights and to managers using insider information for 
personal enrichment. The corporate scandals, having resounded around the world during 
the recent decade, revealed serious drawbacks in corporate governance systems. Thus, the 
study of dividend policy, as a way to mitigate the agency problem and the factors affecting 
it, is of relevance in general and in the context of the Russian market, for example, in view of 
existence of such factors aggravating the agency problem as high concentration of 
ownership and weak legal protection of shareholders’ rights. 
 
There is a limited number of studies based on Russian companies and dealing with the 
problems range in question. This research, in a way filling up the gap in the studies in place, 
is based on data on companies having two classes of shares simultaneously traded on RTS 
stock exchange during 2003-2009. 
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2. Dividend policy, corporate governance and dual class shares structures 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (Jensen, Meckling, 1976), agency costs arise when the 
decisions taken by the managers entail destruction of the company’s value and the investors 
have to incur monitoring costs. One of the mechanisms capable to reduce agency costs is 
decrease of the cash flow at the managers’ disposal. Availability of an ample free cash flow 
results in managers adopting more investment programs even if with low net present value 
(NPV). Thus, payment of extra funds to shareholders in the form of dividends is more 
appropriate to avoid such funds spending in a way ineffective from the point of view of the 
company value maximization. Easterbrook (Easterbrook, 1984) notes that dividends are the 
main means of reduction of the cash flow available to managers and play an important role 
in the agency problem mitigation. 
 
Another argument in favour of dividend payment is the assertion that firm pay dividends in 
order to create a favourable image and avoid underestimate of the company in situations 
when the firm has to raise external capital. Increasing the dividends paid, the company has 
to resort to the capital market to raise funds to make investments. This entails thorough 
evaluation of the management’s decisions by potential investors which also mitigates the 
agency problem. 
 
According to studies (such as, for example: (Shleifer, Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000)), 
pyramidal structures of property, cross-holdings, issue of two or more types of shares and 
other mechanisms used for changing the proportionality and distribution of risk and control 
within the company represent a source of agency costs. These instruments are capable to 
increase private benefits from control and the conflict of interests between major and 
minority shareholders and, accordingly, may affect the company’s dividend policy. R.La Porta 
(La Porta et al., 2000) qualifies issue of two classes of shares as one of the most apparent 
and frequent ways of managers and shareholders “entrenchment”. 
 
In companies with two classes of shares cash flow and voting rights are distributed 
unequally. Thus, in companies with two classes of shares the conflict of interests is more 
acute than in those with but a single class of shares. Co-existence of two classes of shares 
within a company enables the largest holder to maintain control over the company through 
holding a large portion of voting shares without the need to have hold of shares conferring 
rights to cash flow only. Thus, the largest shareholder is capable to control decision-taking 
within the company without assuming the costs burden. This enables a greater extent of 
benefiting at the expense of minority shareholders as compares to largest shareholders of 
companies with but a single class of shares. 
 
In Russia the two classes of shares were introduced in 1992 parallel to the privatization 
program launch. The program envisaged three variants of state-owned enterprises 
privatization and stipulated obligatory introduction of a corporate charter for all large state-
owned enterprises proposed as privatization targets. One of privatization ways was 
transformation of state-owned enterprises into companies with chartered capital wherein 
preferred or non-voting shares freely distributed among the active and retired employees of 
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the company could account for as much as 25%. 
 
The legal status of the two classes of shares was defined in the charters of all privatized 
companies. Notably, the status of ordinary shares was similar to that of ordinary shares in 
most developed countries (grant of the right to vote at a general meeting of shareholders 
and the right to dividends the amount whereof was undefined) while preferred shares had 
certain specificity. 
 
Since enactment of the federal law “On joint-stock companies” in 1996 the rights granted by 
preferred shares became variable, depending on changes in companies’ charters. Thus, 
holders of preferred shares ceased to enjoy the veto right but were occasionally granted the 
right to vote at a general meeting of shareholders. But since the portion of preferred shares 
in the chartered capital was not in excess of 25%, their holders could not ban any decision. 
Additionally, the law ceased to attach to holder of preferred shares the right to dividends 
amounting to 10% of net profit, confining itself to indication that companies be obliged to 
define in their charters the amount of dividends on preferred shares in the form of a fixed 
percentage of the company’s net profit or in any other clearly defined form. With a view of 
enhancing the level of minority shareholders’ rights protection several important 
amendments were introduced to the law in 2001. Thus, the veto right was returned to 
preferred shares holders. 
 
Preferred shares have certain advantages over ordinary ones. However, absence of the right 
of vote and the company being entitled to partly define the rights under preferred shares at 
its own discretion demonstrate essential inequality between the two classes of shareholders 






For a long time empirical studies in corporate governance dealt mostly with companies with 
dispersed ownership structure (Grossman, Hart, 1980). Investigators into dividend policy 
focused mostly on the impact of the owner holding the controlling block of shares on 
decisions taken on dividend payment (see, For example, (Jensen, Meckling, 1976; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986)). However, the ownership structures prevailing in many countries involve 
presence of multiple major shareholders within the company. For example, in Germany 
about a quarter of publicly traded companies have two or more shareholders with a portion 
of shares amounting to at least 20% (Gomes and Novaes, 2005). According to works 
available (Maury and Pajuste, 2002; Bebczuk, 2005), such companies’ dividend policy is the 
result of largest shareholders interaction: formation of coalitions or largest shareholders 
fight for influence on decision-taking. Only recently researches started to study the 
categories and amount of largest shareholders’ ownership portions as well as such 
controlling group’s impact on the fact of minority shareholders expropriation. 
 
According to the studies of S.Grossman and O.Hart (Grossman nad Hart, 1980) as well as 
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A.Shleifer and R.Vishny (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), it is the major shareholders that should 
carry out management monitoring. Presence of a major shareholder within the company 
mitigates “the free rider problem”, accordingly reducing agency costs. Shareholders in 
possession of a major portion of shares are more incentivized to carry out management 
monitoring since the benefits from such monitoring considerably exceed the implementation 
costs. Notably, the more recent works by R.La Porta (La Porta et al., 2000) and А. Gomes 
(Gomes, 2000) state that in countries where the legal protection of shareholders is weak it is 
through high concentration of ownership that the agency problem is to be reduced. 
 
At the same time, existence of shareholders in possession of a major portion of shares or a 
controlling shareholder among the company owners may be unfavourable for less influential 
stakeholders. A.Shleifer and R.Vishny (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) assert that in a situation 
when major shareholders obtain almost complete control over the firm they begin to derive 
private benefits minority shareholders fail to participate in. There are multiple ways of 
minority shareholders’ rights impairment, M.Faccio, L.Lang and L.Young (Faccio, Lang and 
Young, 2001) specially emphasizing low dividend payments. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Increase of percentage of ordinary shares held by a major shareholder will lead 
to decrease of dividend payments. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Increase of percentage of ordinary shares held by three major shareholders 
will lead to decrease of dividend payments. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Increase of percentage of ordinary shares held by the second largest 
shareholder will lead to increase of dividend payments. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Decrease of the difference between the amounts of ordinary shares held by 
the first and the second largest shareholders will lead to increase of dividend payments. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Presence of a controlling shareholder within the company will lead to decrease 
of dividend payments. 
 
Hypothesis 6. Largest shareholders having a portion of ordinary shares exceeding that of 
preferred shares will prefer dividend payments to decrease. 
 
It is worthy of note that researchers’ opinions differ with regard to practically every of the 
listed suppositions concerning the described relations character. This fact is quite 
understandable. Legislation peculiarities, level of financial markets development, 
corporation’s evolution history and legal status of holders of different types of shares entail 
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4. Methodology 
 
The study aimed to reveal the character of ownership structure impact on the dividend 
policy of Russian companies with two classes of shares is based on a regression model (1): 
itititititit uZYXPayoutDiv   43210_ ,    i =1, …,n; t =1, …, Т. (1) 
Dependent variable Div_Payoutit characterizes the dividend payout ratio of company i at 
moment t. In equation (1) Xit is  the vector of variables characterizing concentration of 
ordinary shares in the hands of the company’s shareholders (dimension (m 1)) ; Yit is  the  
vector of variables characterizing the type of the company’s major shareholders (dimension 
k1)); Zit is the variable determining the largest shareholder’s portfolio structure; it  is the  
vector of variables “in charge of” the company’s financial and economic standing indicators 
(dimension (l1));  itu is a random disturbance. All the vectors and variable have index it 
showing that the data are measured for each company i at time moment t. Note that the 




5. Data and sample  
 
Included into the study sample were companies that were traded on RTS stock exchange 
during 2003-2009 and had two classes of shares. All in all, during 2003 - 2009 there were 145 
such companies. The final panel is composed of 598 observations. The conditions for 
companies to be included in the sample were as follows: both classes of shares 
simultaneously traded on RTS stock exchange; dividends paid in cash form. The required 
data on the companies’ ownership structure and dividend payments were obtained from the 
issuers' quarterly reports. For collection of data on the results of financial and business 
activities, ownership concentration, the largest owners identity, amount of dividends paid 
and other details of the issuers we used SKRIN and SPARK public databases. See Table 1 for 




 Dependent variables 
Div_Payout The aggregate dividend payout ratio, the variable characterizing the company’s 
dividend policy. Div_Payout value is calculated as the ratio of the sum total of 
dividends actually paid on the both classes of shares during the year to the firm’s net 
profit following the results of the year wherefore the dividends were paid  
Ord_Payout Ratio of dividend payout on ordinary shares; calculated as the ratio of the amount of 
dividends actually paid on ordinary shares during the year to the firm’s net profit 
following the results of the year wherefore the dividends were paid  
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Pref_Payout Ratio of dividend payout on preferred shares; calculated as the ratio of the amount of 
dividends actually paid on preferred shares during the year to the firm’s net profit 
following the results of the year wherefore the dividends were paid  
 Independent variables 
 Variables included in vector X  
Share_1  Largest shareholder’s ordinary shares portion  
Share_2  Second largest shareholder’s ordinary shares portion  
Share_3  Third largest shareholder’s ordinary shares portion  
Conc_3  Portion of ordinary shares held by the three largest shareholders  
Spread Difference between the portions of ordinary shares in possession of the first and the 
second largest shareholders  
Control(d) Binary variable characterizing existence of a controlling shareholder within the 
company. Its value is equal to 1 if there is a shareholder with a 50% portion of 
shares within the company and to 0 if otherwise  
Share_2(d) Binary variable characterizing existence of a second largest shareholder within the 
company who is a blockholder. Its value is equal to 1 if the second largest 
shareholder’s portion of ordinary shares is in excess of 25% and to 0 if otherwise  
 Variable Z 
Power_1  Variable characterizing the largest shareholder’s portfolio structure The variable 
value is calculated as the ratio between the portions of, accordingly, preferred and 
ordinary shares belonging to the largest shareholder  
 Variables included in vector   
Size Variable characterizing the company size and measured as the natural logarithm of 
sales  
ROA Return on assets  
Leverage Variable characterizing the company capital structure: debt to equity ratio.   
Table 1: Description of variables used in regression analysis 
 
For the results of descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis see Table 2. 
 
From Table 2 it follows that the average value of the aggregate dividend payout ratio for the 
whole of the period is 0.311 which means that the sampled companies paid out in the form 
of dividends, on the average, approximately 31% of their net profit. Preliminary statistical 
analysis showed that the minimum value of the dividend payout ratio was –0.401 since nine 
of the companies under observation paid dividends having a negative value of net profit 
while the maximum dividend payout ratio value was 2.393. Such situations when the 
dividend payout ratio value is negative or in excess of 1 are possible in cases when the 
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company pays out dividends from reserves18. In the course of further statistical and 




Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Minimum  Maximum  
Div_Payout 0.311  0.681  0  1.934  
Ord_Payout 0.236  0.606  0  2.901  
Pref_Payout 0.078  0.099  0  0.982  
Share_1  0.563  0.176  0.072  0.995  
Share_2  0.159  0.092  0  0.449  
Share_3  0.059  0.069  0  0.295  
Conc_3  0.781  0.143  0.073  0.995  
Spread 0.404  0.229  0  0.995  
Power_1  0.156  0.585  0  1.915  
Size 22.736  1.627  16  27.630  
Leverage 201.167  711.693  0  2336.270  
ROA 5.944  11.181  0  39.487  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Analysis of the average dividend payments dynamics evidences considerable fluctuation of 
the dividend payout ratio from year to year. Notably (as we already remarked above), the 
largest fluctuation of dividend payout ratio occurred in 2006–2009. 
 
Thus, from the descriptive statistics, behaviour of dividend payout ratio as well as the main 
ownership concentration characteristics it follows that the amount of dividends paid by the 
companies underwent a considerable variation during the period under consideration. 
Notably, a variation also occurred in the companies' ownership concentration and the ratio 
of the amounts of the largest shareholders' portions, and consequently - in the character of 
such shareholders’ interaction as well. In order to test the suppositions concerning existence 
and character of the relation between the dividend amount paid and the ownership 
concentration we applied regression analysis. 
 
 
6. Regression analysis results 
 
See Table 3 for the results of the regression analysis wherein the following three types of 
dividend payout ratio were used as the dependent variables: aggregate ratio of dividend 
payout on the both classes of shares (Div_Payout), for ordinary shares (Ord_Payout) and 
preferred shares (Pref_Payout). Consequent testing of the models demonstrated that the 
                                                          
18
 See [Russian Federal Law on Joint-Stock companies, 1995, p. 2, page 42]. 
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fixed effect model describes the empirical data most adequately. 
 
All the models apart from that presented in Column 9 are statistically significant. Variable 
Share_3, Conc_3, (Conc_3)
2 turned significant in all the models. Variable Control(d) is 
significant in the models where the dependent variables are: ratio of dividend payout on the 
both classes of shares Div_Payout и dividend payout ratio for ordinary shares Ord_Payout. In 
the model (see Column 11) wherein the dependent variable is represented by the ratio of 
dividend payout on preferred shares Pref_Payout, in contrast to the other model, it is the 
variable characterizing the largest shareholder’s portion of ordinary shares Share_1 that is 
significant. In some parameter assessments the coefficients on the significant variables are 
different from those supposed. Thus, the coefficient on the variable Control(d) has a positive 
sign in spite of the hypothesis put forward alleging existence of a reverse relation between 
the dividend payments amount and existence of a controlling shareholder within the 
company. 
 
Let us proceed to analysis of the variables characterizing the impact of ownership 
concentration on the dividend payout ratio (Table 3). Contrary to the supposition concerning 
existence of the link between the major shareholder’s portions of ordinary shares and 
Div_Payout and Ord_Payout, variables Share_1 (largest shareholder’s ownership portion) 
and Share_2 (second largest shareholder’s ownership stake) are insignificant in the models 
(Columns 1, 2, 6 and 7). However, in the model with Pref_Payout as the dependent variable 
(Column 11) the coefficient on the variable characterizing the largest shareholder’s portion 
of ordinary shares Share_1 is significant. Consequently, one can admit the supposition on 
existence of a reverse relationship between concentration of ordinary shares held by the 
largest shareholder and the amount of dividends paid on preferred shares. 
 
Additionally, one revealed statistically significant relation between the third largest 
shareholder’s portion of ordinary shares Share_3 and the dividend payout ratios. The 
negative value of the coefficient (Columns 1, 6, 11) shows that this variable is inversely 
related to the three types of the dividend payout ratio. With regard to this variable no 
hypothesis was put forward, the variable having been introduced with a view of analyzing 
the relation revealed in the paper (Maury and Pajuste, 2002). 
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Dividend payout ratio 
Type of the ratio Div_Payout Ord_Payout Pref_Payout 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Share_1 –0.146 0.012    –0.100 –0.007    –0.067** –0.132    
Share_2 0.108 0.285    0.090 0.039    –0.038 0.024    
Share_3 –1.267*** –0.675    –0.914*** 0.047    –0.206*** 0.023    
Share_1^2  –0.179     –0.142     0.050    
Share_2^2  –0.659     0.047     –0.171    
Share_3^2  –3.270     –5.600*     –1.475**    
Conc_3   –2.249** –0.352    –1.815** 0.185    –0.374** –0.053  
Conc_3^2   1.551** 0.265    1.288** –0.041    0.229* 0.012  
Spread   0.099 0.072    0.056 0.022    0.011 0.005  
Control(d)     0.175***     0.147***     0.012 
Share2(d)     0.018     0.069     0.008 
Power_1    –0.039 –0.018    0.003 0.017    0.001 0.007 
Size 0.078** 0.082** 0.065* 0.071* 0.095** 0.085*** 0.090*** 0.073** 0.077 0096*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
Leverage –0.0002** –0.0002** -0.0002** –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001* –0.0001 –0.0001* –0.00002* –0.00002 –0.00002* –0.00002* –0.00002* 
ROA –0.005** –0.005** –0.005** –0.005** –0.005** –0.003* –0.003* –0.003* –0.003 –0.003** 0.000 –0.000 0.000 –0.001 –0.001 
Cons –1.272 –1.403 –0.370 –1.178 –1.943** –1.591** –1.715** –0.839 –1.643 -2.08*** –0.294* –0.291* –0.159 –0.317* –0.452*** 
R2 0.0111 0.0141 0.0056 0.0024 0.0124 0.0054 0.0088 0.0021 0.0001 0.0043 0.0021 0.0058 0.0012 0.0004 0 
p-value 0.0002 0.001 0.0065 0.0461 0.0005 0.0015 0.0032 0.0128 0.1289 0.0006 0.0036 0.0042 0.011 0.0954 0.0237 
N 551 551 551 541 542 519 519 519 509 510 514 514 514 504 505 
Note: *, **, and *** mean significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively  
Table 3: Regression analysis results 
 
We found statistically significant non-linear relation between the aggregate portion of 
ordinary shares held by the three largest shareholders Conc_3 and the value of the dividend 
payout ratio for the both classes of shares as well as for the ordinary and the preferred 
shares viewed separately (Columns 3, 8, 13). Analysis of the quadratic function (Column 3) 
shows that growth of ordinary shares concentration in possession of the three largest 
shareholders from 7.3 to 73% brings about decrease of the ratio of dividend payout on the 
both classes of shares Div_Payout, while further concentration growth within the range from 
73 to 99.5% will entail increase of the dividend payout ratio. Similar analysis of the quadratic 
function (Column 8) that in case of variable Conc_3 value change from 7.3 to 70.5% the 
amount of dividend payments on ordinary shares Ord_Payout is reduced, further change of 
the variable value within the interval from 70.5 to 99.5%, entailing increase of the ratio of 
dividend payout on ordinary shares. Additionally, the results of analysis of the non-linear 
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function (Column 13) enable one to conclude that at a 7.3-81.7% concentration of ordinary 
shares growth in concentration of ordinary shares in possession of the three largest 
shareholders will entail decrease of dividend payments on preferred shares Pref_Payout. 
Notably, increase of ordinary shares concentration within the interval from 81.7 to 99.5% 
will entail increase of the volume of dividend payments on preferred shares. 
 
According to the results obtained (Columns 5 and 10), there is a statistically significant 
relation between the ratio of dividend payout on the both classes of shares Div_Payout and 
on ordinary shares Ord_Payout and existence of a controlling shareholder within the 
company. Relying on the coefficients signs, one may conclude that the amount of dividend 
payments on the both classes of shares and on ordinary shares with companies having a 
controlling shareholder are accordingly 17.5% and 14.7% higher as compared to companies 
without a controlling shareholder. 
 
The other ownership concentration indicators (difference between the two largest 
shareholders’ portions of ordinary shares Spread and fact of presence of a second largest 
shareholder with a block stake described by the binary variable Share2(d) turned 
insignificant in all the models considered. 
 
Analysis of the models wherein variable Power_1 (characterizing the largest shareholder’s 
portfolio structure) is used (Columns 4 and 5, 9 and 10, 14 and 15) fails to allow of a 
conclusion on the possibility of the largest shareholder using the portion of ordinary shares 
in excess of that of preferred ones to derive private benefits of control and reduction of the 
level of dividends paid. From the regression analysis it follows that this variable is statistically 
insignificant. 
One may conclude that dividend policy on preferred shares considerably differs from that on 
ordinary shares and is determined predominantly by the company’s performance measures 





Taking into account high concentration of ownership in Russian companies with two classes 
of shares as well as imperfection of the Russian legislation concerning protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights, we supposed that increase of ordinary shares concentration in the 
hands of the largest shareholders is associated with lower dividend payments because of the 
largest shareholders deriving private benefits of control. However, we did not reveal the 
relation between the amount of aggregate dividend payments on the both classes of shares 
and that of the ordinary shares portions held by the largest and the second largest 
shareholders. Notably, there is a nonlinear relationship between dividend payout ratio and 
concentration of ordinary shares in possession of the three largest shareholders. We found 
out that with companies where ordinary shares concentration in possession of the three 
largest shareholders grows from 7.3 to 73% the dividend payout ratio on the both classes of 
shares aggregately will decrease while further ordinary shares concentration growth (within 
the range from 73 to 99.5%) will lead to increase of the dividend payout ratio. One of the 
hypotheses was that existence of a controlling shareholder within the company will lead to 
decrease of dividend payments. It found confirmation, for example, in the market of Finland 
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(Maury and Pajuste, 2002). However, according to our study, with companies having a 
shareholder with a controlling portion of ordinary shares, the average value of the dividend 
payout ratio is 17.5% higher as compared to companies without a controlling owner. Thus, 
the hypothesis previously put forward was not supported. 
 
Relying on the results obtained, we may conclude that the character of the relation between 
the ownership concentration factors and the ratio of dividend payout on ordinary shares 
considerably differs from the said factors relation with dividend payments on preferred 
shares. We found a similar link between the ratio of dividend payout on ordinary shares and 
the company’s financial and economic indicators, a non-linear relationship with 
concentration of ownership in the hands of three largest shareholders, a direct relationship 
with the factor characterizing the fact of a controlling shareholder presence. At the same 
time, we revealed that most ownership concentration factors fail to significantly affect the 
amount of dividend payments on preferred shares. 
 
However, we confirmed the hypothesis on existence of a reverse relationship between 
concentration of ordinary shares in the hands of the largest shareholder and the amount of 
dividends paid. Such a result may be demonstrating a manifestation of the agency problem 
between the major and the minority shareholders in accordance wherewith the largest 
shareholder strives to reduce the portion of net profit paid in the form of dividends on 
preferred shares and to use this part of free cash flow for deriving private benefits. The 
reverse relationship between the ratio of dividend payout on preferred shares and the 
largest shareholder’s portion of ordinary shares may be attributed to largest shareholder, as 
a rule, failing to strive at possession of preferred shares or having held of but a small portion 
thereof. According to the descriptive statistics data, 77% of the largest owners fail to have 
preferred shares in their portfolios, the average amount of the largest shareholder’s portion 
of preferred shares being 6.8%. The reverse relation between the amount of dividends on 
preferred shares and concentration of ordinary shares in possession of the largest 
shareholder, at first sight, contradicts the result on existence of direct relation between the 
amounts of both dividend payments on ordinary shares and aggregate dividend payments 
on the both classes of shares and existence of a shareholder with a control stake within the 
company. This result may be attributed to controlling owners having hold of small portions 
of the company’s preferred shares: only 20% of controlling shareholders hold preferred 
shares, the average amount of preferred shares portion with controlling owners being 6.1% 
of the total amount of the company’s preferred shares. Thus, largest shareholders, 
apparently, may be not interested in high dividend payments on preferred shares. 
 
Thus, dividend policy on preferred shares considerably differs from that on ordinary shares 
and is determined predominantly by the company’s financial and economic indicators and 
ownership concentration. However, the amount of dividend payments on preferred shares, 
unlike those of dividend payments on ordinary shares and aggregate dividend payments, is 
unaffected by existence of a controlling shareholder that, according to the results of the 
analysis, is represented by the state or state corporations to an extent of 74%. As one has 
previously noted, controlling shareholders, on the average, hold a small portion of preferred 
shares and thus may be not interested in increase of dividends on preferred shares, the 
same way they are interested in dividends on ordinary shares. 
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Based on the study results one may conclude that ownership concentration factors more 
apparently affect the amount of dividend payments on ordinary shares while dividend 
payments on preferred shares (determined predominantly by the company’s financial results 
and decisions of the largest shareholder) are an obligation of the company similar to debt 
obligations on the one hand and means to manipulate distribution of voting shares among 
the largest shareholders - on the other. 
 
All the aforesaid serves to raise questions regarding legal protection of preferred 
shareholders’ rights in general and such rights abuse by large shareholders of the company 
that are holders or ordinary shares. It appears that even further steps for enhancement of 
investors’ rights protection level are not likely to dismantle the acute problem. Only 
unification of shares classes meaning equalization of shareholders’ control and cash flow 
rights as per one share may promote mitigation of the agency problem with regard to the 




1. Bebczuk R. Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 
2. Bebczuk R. Corporate Governance and Ownership: Measurement and Impact on Corporate Performance 
and Dividend Policies in Argentina Inter-American Development Bank Research Network. Working Paper 
N R-516. 2005.  
3. Easterbrook F. Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends American Economic Review. 1984., 74. pp. 
650–659. 
4. Faccio M., Lang L., Young L. Dividends and Expropriation. American Economic Review. 2001., 91(1). pp. 
54–78. 
5. Gomes A. Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects Journal of Finance. 2000, 
55(2). pp. 615–646. 
6. Gomes A., Novaes W. Sharing of Control versus Monitoring as Corporate Governance Mechanisms. 
Working Paper N 01–029. Pennsilvania Institute for Economic Research, 2005. 
7. Grossman S., Hart O. Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation Bell 
Journal of Economics. 1980., 11(1) pp. 42–64. 
8. Grossman S., Hart O. One Share, One Vote, and the Market for Corporate Control Journal of Financial 
Economics. 1988. 20(1/2) pp. 175–202. 
9. Jensen M., Meckling W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure Journal of Financial Economics. 1976., 3(4 )pp. 305–360. 
10. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the 
World Journal of Finance. 2000., 55(1). pp. 1–33. 
11. Maury C. B., Pajuste A. Controlling Shareholders, Agency Problems, and Dividend Policy in Finland. 
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration. Working Paper: pp. 15-45. 2002. 
12. Maury C. B., Pajuste A. Private Benefits of Control and Dual – Class Share Unification. Swedish School of 
Economics and Business Administration. Working Paper. 2007. 
13. Shleifer A., Vishny R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control The Journal of Political Economy. 1986., 
94(3) pp. 461–488.  
14. Shleifer A., Vishny R. A Survey on Corporate Governance Journal of Finance. 1997., 52(2). pp. 737–783. 
  
